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REPLY 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF REJOINDER 
TO PROFESSOR KAMISAR 
Akhil Reed Amar* 
and 
Renee B. Lettow** 
Professor Yale Kamisar has been writing in the field of criminal 
procedure for many years, and we are grateful that he has chosen to 
respond to our ideas. At the outset of his long and lively response 
to Fifth Amendment First Principles,1 Professor Kamisar promises 
to analyze our constitutional argument, with "special attention" to 
"current doctrines or trends."2 But in what follows, he offers al-
most no analysis of, well, the Constitution - its text, its history, its 
structure. We believe that constitutional law should, ideally, bear 
some relation to, well, the Constitution. Professor Kamisar, it 
seems, does not. He also sidesteps most of our main points. 
Begin with the constitutional text. When John Doe is obliged -
under pain of contempt - to testify before Congress, or in a civil 
case, the Fifth Amendment has not (yet) been violated: it applies 
only to a criminal case. If Doe's congressional, or civil, testimony is 
never introduced as evidence in a criminal case, the Amendment, 
on our plain meaning reading, once again has never been violated: 
Doe has never been made an involuntary witness against himself in 
a criminal case. When Congress or a civil court compels te&timony, 
this is generally not cruel, or barbarous, or uncivilized - or uncon-
stitutional. There is no poisonous tree here and thus no constitu-
tional basis for excluding its "fruit." Kastigar3 is thus wrong. This 
plain textual argument has considerable support in American and 
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed. 
** Student, Yale Law School. A.B. 1990, Princeton; M.Litt. 1993, Oxford. - Ed. What 
follows is a brief rejoinder to Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced 
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929 (1995). 
1. See Akhil Reed Amar & Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The 
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995). 
2. Kamisar, supra note**, at 936. 
3. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
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English history, in the language and spirit of kindred constitutional 
clauses, and in more general principles of constitutional structure. 
It also solves many practical problems in current doctrine, and reso-
nates with a deeply rooted moral and constitutional norm that inno-
cent defendants be protected against erroneous convictions based 
on unreliable evidence. 
Professor Kamisar never squarely engages these constitutional 
arguments. He begins his analysis not in civil courtrooms or con-
gressional hearings, but in police stations.4 But, as we were at pains 
to say in our article, these proceedings are very different. Rogue 
police can be cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized. Abusive actions in 
police stations, squad cars, and crime scenes are themselves uncon-
stitutional - they are paradigmatic unreasonable searches and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment. But, if a defendant's co-
erced "confession" - witnessing - is never introduced in a crimi-
nal case, the Fifth Amendment, on our reading, is not violated.s 
What's more - and this is a separate point - the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require exclusion of anything in a criminal case. 
Our Fourth Amendment logic is based on the article Fourth 
Amendment First Principles6 - and here, too, Professor Kamisar 
fails to present and squarely address the many constitutional argu-
ments. To ruthlessly compress: the text of the Fourth Amendment 
nowhere calls for exclusion. Its reference to the people's right to be 
secure "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" conjures up 
tort and property law, which protect these interests. No one at the 
Founding thought the Amendment required or invited exclusion. 
No English court, then or now, ever embraced exclusion. Both 
4. This is the vast bulk of Parts I and II of Professor Kamisar's article. See supra note ••, 
at 936-80. We explore the consequences of this "backwards" analysis infra note 5. 
5. Professor Kamisar's backwards organization - starting in brutal police stations and 
only later considering civilized questioning in civil cases, before Congress, in grand juries, 
and so on, is not harmless error. When he finally gets around to talking about Kastigar 
proper, he defends it as an application of the poisonous tree doctrine. See, e.g., Kamisar, 
supra note ••, at 986-88, 1005-06. But this is utterly question-begging. On our textual ac-
count, no Fifth Amendment violation has occurred merely because Kastigar was obliged to 
testify outside his own case. If his words are not introduced inside his case, before the jury, 
no Fifth Amendment violation will ever occur. We reject Kastigar for the same reason 
Kamisar embraces Schmerber (a case he wrongly sees as irrelevant): The government did not 
"violate a constitutional guarantee at any point along the way •••• No fruits of [government] 
misconduct were involved in [Kastigar] because there was no misconduct." Id. at 957, 1006. 
If Professor Kamisar believes that asking civilized questions in civilized settings is itself 
misconduct or poisonous, he must explain why - he must, that is, offer an account of self-
incrimination proper and not of police barbarism. But he has failed to do this. 
6. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. RBv. 757 
(1994). 
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American and English courts understood that tort suits and puni-
tive damages were necessary to protect citizens from wrongful in-
trusions. No court in America, state or federal, ever excluded 
before 1886. When exclusion did come to America, it came via 
Boyd's1 1886 fusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments - a fu-
sion whose early progeny included both Counselmans and Weeks. 9 
But this fusion, we have argued, is based on a plain misreading of 
the words and spirit of both Amendments. The modem Court has 
now decisively rejected this fusion.10 
Without fusion, exclusion has no leg to stand on as a constitu-
tional mandate. Judicial integrity does not require exclusion - just 
look at England, or American civil courts where exclusion has 
never been the rule. The idea that government should never profit 
from its own wrong sounds nice - but exclusion often lets 
criminals profit from their wrong. The Fourth Amendment does 
not require that government return drugs to drug dealers, or stolen 
goods to thieves. Government, courts have always held, may con-
stitutionally keep the contraband; and, we submit, by the same 
logic, government may constitutionally use the contraband as evi-
dence. Finally, government must be deterred from violating Fourth 
Amendment rights, but that is what punitive damages and strict ad-
ministrative disciplinary schemes - which we propose, following 
the Framers - are for. Exclusion will not deter if the police want 
to abuse someone they know to be innocent, or if they just want to 
get drugs off the street, or return stolen goods to their rightful 
owner, or use evidence civilly, or use it against another criminal 
target, or ... 
In a nutshell, these are some of our main constitutional argu-
ments about the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Professor Kamisar 
does not squarely engage these and many of our other constitu-
tional claims.11 What he does discuss at length is what courts have 
7. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
8. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 {1892). 
9. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
10. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 {1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
11. Professor Kamisar chides us for not discussing the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note **, at 1006. But cf. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, 
908 n.227, 917 n.265. There are two reasons why we do not discuss this doctrine at length. 
First, unlike Professor Kamisar, we do not begin and end in the police station. Rather, we 
seek to offer a much more global account of all Fifth Amendment doctrine - government-
employer cases, required records, subpoenas, immunity, and so on. Second, the fruit doc-
trine, we believe, ultimately derives from Fourth Amendment rules about exclusion; and one 
of us has elsewhere set out at length a critique of all Fourth Amendment exclusion claimed to 
be mandated by the Constitution. See Amar, supra note 6. As we have proclaimed here 
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said. We of course agree that precedent is an important part of 
constitutional law. The problem is, precedent in this area is often 
convoluted and contradictory. Professor Kamisar can quote Justice 
Frankfurter for the Court in the 1961 Rogers case12 as poo-pooing 
reliability; and we can quote Justice Souter for the Court in the 
1993 Withrow case13 and Justice O'Connor for the Court in the 1985 
Elstad case14 as tightly linking the Fifth Amendment to reliability. 
(Technically, of course, the Rogers language does not address the 
Self-Incrimination Clause - nor does the Rochin language Profes-
sor Kamisar leans on15 -whereas both Withrow and Elstad do dis-
cuss the Self-Incrimination Clause, proper.) Professor Kamisar can 
point to Justice Brennan's narrow reading of the logic of Schmer-
ber;16 and we can point to Justice O'Connor and Judge Friendly's 
broader account of its deep structure.17 
The precedents, in short, look in different directions at once. In 
order to pick which direction to follow - which of the tangled 
strands to isolate and embroider upon - the legal community and 
the Court need a clear account of what the clause is and should be 
about. Ideally, that account should not require total repudiation of 
everything the modem Court has said and done. We believe our 
account meshes well with the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' gen-
eral themes of innocence, reliability, and truth-seeking. Professor 
Kamisar may disagree and say that we have, for example, overreact 
Justice O'Connor.18 On the other hand, he admits he disagrees 
repeatedly - from our title and opening footnote to our final paragraph - our argument 
today builds upon that earlier work. Our main argument today is also analytically severable. 
Some readers may accept our Fifth Amendment idea of testimonial immunity for civilized 
testimony, but reject our Fourth Amendment views. For these readers, fruits of police brutal-
ity should be suppressed, but not fruits of civilized depositions. 
12. See Kamisar, supra note**, at 939-40 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 
540-41 (1961)). 
13. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 895 n.172 (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. 
Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993)). 
14. See id. at 882 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985)). 
15. See Kamisar,supra note**, at 954 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 
(1952)). Elsewhere, Professor Kamisar acknowledges that his quotes from Rochin and Rog-
ers are, technically, off point. See id. at 943. 
16. See id. at 957-58 & n.123 (quoting, inter alia, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
765 (1966)). 
17. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 882 & nn.102-03; id. at 887. Schmerber's holding 
- that a criminal suspect can indeed be forced to furnish evidence against himself - negates 
the root premise of Counselman and Kastigar. Professor Kamisar misses this in Part III of his 
article. 
18. See Kamisar, supra note**, at 968-75. But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 883 
n.109. 
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with her votes in these cases, whereas we applaud them; and his 
reading of her underlying vision may simply be too grudging. 
Ideally, however, an attractive theory must do more than reso-
nate with important themes in modem precedents. It should also 
mesh with the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, and 
with attractive normative principles. It should be rooted in a big 
idea or ideas worthy of inclusion in an enduring document pro-
claimed in the name of the People. In our article, we try to provide 
just such an account. Without such an account, thoughtful judges 
cannot decide which strands in precedent to follow and which to 
discard. 
The challenge of our article to Professor Kamisar and other 
leaders in the field who might reject our account is to come up with 
their own more attractive constitutional account of the Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause - to figure out what it says, and why, and to root 
that reading in text, history, and structure, as well as precedent. 
With respect, he has failed to provide such an account until now; 
and his response today likewise fails to provide a clear coherent 
constitutional account. 
